Scientific Attempts to Bridge the Moral Gap (part 1)
Introduction: What can science tell us about morality?
In reference to morality, J.L. Mackie stated, “…objective intrinsically prescriptive features, supervening upon natural ones, constitute so odd a cluster of qualities and relations that they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events, without an all-powerful god to create them.”[1] Here Mackie is arguing against the existence of objective moral values. He suggests that if moral values were objective and had intrinsic, prescriptive qualities, meaning they tell us what we ought to do, they would be extremely unusual and complex. So strange that it's unlikely they could exist naturally. In fact, belief in objective morality may implicitly require belief in God to explain its existence. For a philosophical naturalist like Mackie, this is quite an admission.
Yet many who share Mackie’s naturalist worldview are not as willing to surrender the possibility of objective morality. They argue that moral values can emerge from “the ordinary course of events.” In fact, naturalists often claim that a foundation for morality, if one is to be found, must be found in science.
Sam Harris asserts “that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, just as there are right and wrong answers to questions of physics, and such answers may one day fall within reach of the maturing sciences of mind.”[2] He suggests that on that day “…morality will be on firmer ground than any other branch of science….”[3] Many naturalists make similar claims—morality is real and the key to understanding the nature of right and wrong, good and evil, is to be found scientifically.
However, I would argue that science cannot provide the grounding for morality that Harris and other “moral scientists”[4] seek. In the next several articles, I want to argue that exclusively scientific explanations are unable to prescribe moral behavior because they are necessarily descriptive. Therefore, if I want to say that there is such a thing as objective morality, I’m going to need more than science to explain it.
In the next article, I will discuss two relevant philosophical ideas. First, I will consider what philosopher John E. Hare calls the “the moral gap” between what we ought to do and what we are able to do. I will compare that to what has been called, “Hume’s Law,” that descriptions of what is can never tell us what ought to be.
After that, I will discuss the worldview assumptions of naturalism, focusing on its reliance on science for knowledge. For many, science is the most reliable sources of knowledge, if not the only source. However, I will argue that a scientific explanation of morality will be limited at best, viciously reductionistic at worst.
Finally, I will take a look at three recent scientific attempts to bridge the moral gap. Using Hare’s framework, I find that such attempts typically fail in one of three ways: reducing the moral demand, exaggerating our natural capacities, or replacing God as moral arbiter.
My conclusion: Naturalists cannot bridge the gap between ought and can because the sciences cannot bridge the gap between ought and is.
Here are some terms that will be helpful to know as we proceed:
Naturalism: The belief that everything can be explained by natural causes and laws, without involving supernatural elements.
Moral Objectivity: The idea that certain actions are right or wrong regardless of individual beliefs or feelings.
Moral Subjectivity: The belief that moral judgments are based on personal feelings, opinions, or cultural perspectives.
Scientism: The view that scientific knowledge is the most authoritative and valuable form of knowledge, often to the exclusion of other perspectives.
I look forward to sharing my research and thoughts about this important topic. Stay tuned!
[1] J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 116
[2] Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (New York: Free Press, 2010), 28.
[3] Harris, 219.
[4] Harris frequently refers to the application of science to morality as “moral science.” Elsewhere, Hunter and Nedelisky refer to those attempting to ground morality in science as “moral scientists.”