In previous post, I argued that the bodily resurrection of Jesus Christ lies at the heart of historic Christianity. Contrary to vague spiritualizations or symbolic myths, biblical Christianity unequivocally affirms the physical resurrection as a miraculous historical event. Yet, the belief in miracles presents significant challenges to many people.
We live in an age of skepticism, in which miracles seem too far fetched to be believed. We also live in an age of cynicism, in which miracles seem too good to be true. The prevalent assumption today is that rational people who respect scientific progress must reject miracles as outdated superstitions. Is it possible, then, to reconcile belief in the miraculous resurrection of Jesus with the advances of modern science? I would argue it’s not only possible, it’s rationally compelling. Here are three reasons why.
First, chronological snobbery is as bad as it sounds.
Many of the miracles Christians talk about, namely the resurrection of Christ, happened long ago. The eyewitnesses to those miracles lived before the Enlightenment and the rise modern science. So, perhaps they saw things they perceived as miracles simply because they did not know better.
This is what C.S. Lewis called "chronological snobbery." It is the tendency to discredit ideas simply because they originated in the past. Modern critics often dismiss first-century claims about Jesus’s resurrection and other miracles as naive illusions of ignorant minds. However, such assumptions about ancient intellectual inferiority are unwarranted. As philosopher Timothy McGrew rightly asks, are we really to believe "that Roman soldiers didn’t know how to kill an unarmed man...or that peasants in an agrarian society had not seen enough death to know that dead men stay dead?"
Interestingly, historical records reveal a nuanced skepticism among Jesus’s own followers. Peter and John conducted direct investigation at the empty tomb (Luke 24:12; John 20:3-8). Thomas insisted on empirical verification (John 20:25-28). These accounts suggest an ancient mindset far more empirically cautious than contemporary critics might admit.
Our possession of more advanced scientific knowledge does not mean ancient observers were incapable of accurately perceiving or interpreting reality. Historical humility requires acknowledging the sophistication of past observers and their genuine capacity for discerning extraordinary events.
Second, the laws of nature are descriptive, not prescriptive.
Skepticism about miracles often comes from a misunderstanding of natural laws. Philosophers of science generally agree that the laws of nature are descriptive regularities identified through observation. In other words, they describe what typically occurs, but not what must always occur. This distinction is crucial. Natural laws do not dictate reality. They summarize it under normal conditions.
Typically, scientists use inductive reasoning in their work. This type of thinking assumes that patterns observed in the past will reliably continue into the future. This is not a problem under normal conditions. But, just because something has regularly occurred before does not logically guarantee it will continue to do so. This is called the problem of induction, famously articulated by David Hume.
Applied to miracles, this problem implies that assuming miracles cannot occur because they have not been observed regularly is logically unjustified. Just because something is rare or unprecedented in our experience does not logically rule out its possibility. Assuming that miracles can’t happen because they can’t be scientifically predicted is a category error. If miraculous events could be predicted or demonstrated scientifically, they wouldn’t be very miraculous, would they?
Philosopher Alvin Plantinga illustrated the error of limiting belief solely to observable, regular patterns in an interesting way. He likened it to a drunk searching for lost keys under a streetlight because "the light was better there." Just as the drunk mistakenly assumes that keys must lie within the space he can see, skeptics wrongly assume miracles must conform to natural regularities. Science excels at explaining natural causes, but it remains silent about supernatural ones. The descriptive nature of natural laws thus leaves room for miraculous intervention.
Which leads me to my third point.
Third, miracles are better understood as interventions, not violations.
In the 18th century, one of the most influential critics of miracles, David Hume, defined miracles as "violations of the laws of nature." This has been the most widely accepted definition ever since. It is how most people think of miracles.
However, this conception is flawed. C.S. Lewis illustrated this point most effectively.
“If I put six pennies into a drawer on Monday and six more on Tuesday, the laws decree that. . . I shall find twelve pennies there on Wednesday. But if the drawer has been robbed I may in fact find only two. Something will have been broken (the lock of the drawer or the laws of England) but the laws of arithmetic will not have been broken. The new situation created by the thief will illustrate the laws of arithmetic just as well as the original situation. But if God comes to work miracles, He comes “like a thief in the night.” Miracle is, from the point of view of the scientist, a form of doctoring, tampering, (if you like) cheating. It introduces a new factor into the situation, namely supernatural force, which the scientist had not reckoned on.”1
Miracles are better thought of as divine intervention from beyond nature, not a violation within it. Oxford mathematician John Lennox expands on Lewis's argument, emphasizing that if God created the natural order, divine intervention is not only possible—it’s probably. See his explanation here:
Only if one conclusively demonstrates that no supernatural agent exists—and science is ill-equipped for such metaphysical claims—can miracles be dismissed outright. Thus, belief in miracles remains defensible.
Contemporary philosophy has no shortage of arguments demonstrating how reasonable it is to believe in the possibility of miracles. John Earman, in Hume's Abject Failure, systematically dismantles Hume’s probability argument against miracles. Timothy and Lydia McGrew offer a robust cumulative case for miracles through historical and epistemological analysis, presenting detailed probabilistic arguments supporting the resurrection. Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian approach in The Resurrection of God Incarnate further reinforces the rationality of belief in the resurrection through careful probability calculus. In other words, if you really want to get technical about whether it is logical to believe in the possibility of miracles, you have options.
Remember, the theological implications of the resurrection cannot be overstated. The Apostle Paul contends explicitly in 1 Corinthians 15:14-17 that Christianity itself depends entirely on this historical miracle. The resurrection affirms Jesus's divine identity and serves as a historical guarantee of the believers’ own future resurrection (1 Cor. 15:20-23).
Moreover, robust intellectual defense of miracles significantly impacts spiritual formation. Confidence in the resurrection fosters deep faith, hope, and a profound trust in God’s power to redeem and renew. Pastoral sensitivity also acknowledges the genuine intellectual struggles faced by skeptics. Humility, charity, and patient reasoning characterize Christian engagement with questions about miracles, helping skeptics navigate toward a thoughtful faith rather than dismissing their doubts out of hand.
Ultimately, belief in Jesus Christ’s resurrection depends on one’s assumptions about miracles. If miracles are presupposed impossible, no evidence will suffice.
Yet, as even Hume himself conceded, if the alternative explanation demands an even greater improbability, rationality favors belief. The question, therefore, is not "Can miracles happen?" but rather, "What evidence do we have for this particular miracle?" Hume put it this way:
“When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should have really happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of the testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.”2
Hume admits that if the evidence for a miracle is so thorough that alternate explanations require more of a miracle, then we are justified in our belief. The man that led generations to believe miracles are impossible left the door open for the possibility. So, as we consider the resurrection of Jesus, the question is not, how could anyone believe this? The question is, what evidence do we have?
In the next article, we will take up Hume’s challenge and examine the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus Christ.
C.S. Lewis, Miracles (New York: HarperOne, 2017), 79-80.
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Vol. XXXVII, Part 3, The Harvard Classics (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14), retrieved from Bartleby.com, 2001, www.bartleby.com/37/3/, accessed April 17, 2025.